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Abstract 
This article builds on the intellectual legacy of Jan Tinbergen by extending his analysis on welfare and security into a 
framework involving strategic interaction. I first incorporate welfare and security in terms of interstate tensions into a 
single utility or payoff function. An uncertain world is characterized by states that are more peaceful, and others 
where nations are more hostile to each other. Both conflictual and peaceful outcomes lie along a spectrum of hostility 
short of war. The strategies adopted by the two countries, which promote peace, can be complements or substitutes. 
This means that they can go up or down in response to increases in the strategies of its rival. I demonstrate that non-
cooperative behaviour between nations is Pareto inferior to cooperative behaviour, because the latter is associated 
with more actions and efforts to promote peace. Cooperative behaviour is akin to Tinbergen’s notion of world 
government. Non-cooperative behaviour by states also leads to moral hazard, and there can be free-riding in joint 
peaceful behaviour by some nations, particularly when the strategies of the countries are substitutes. The model is 
extended to aggressive international behaviour, including that mandated by populist plebiscites or election victories, 
as well as an outline of individual behaviour driven by identity-based politics. 
Keywords 
Jan Tinbergen, populism, welfare & security 
Introduction 
2019 marked the 50th anniversary of the first Nobel 
Prize in Economics awarded to Jan Tinbergen.1 Many 
aspects of Tinbergen’s contribution to economics are 
well known, for example his pioneering work in econo-
metrics, macroeconomic modelling, and the rule regard-
ing the correspondence between targets and instruments 
in macroeconomic policymaking. His views about devel-
opment issues are less well known, for example the norm 
regarding the volume of development assistance flows 
from rich to poor nations at 0.7 % of each developed 
country’s national income.2 Even less well known are 
1 Also awarded jointly to the Norwegian economist Ragnar Frisch. 
2 The target for official development assistance flows was originally in 
the 1960s formulated as 0.75% of gross national product. The 
Pearson Commission restated the goal as 0.7% of donor GNI to be 
reached no later than 1980. 
Tinbergen’s analyses of war and peace, particularly his 
characterization of the linkage, indeed the inseparability, 
between welfare and security, and his strong advocacy for 
world government as a means of resolving interstate 
coordination failure. 
The present article attempts to pay homage to Tin-
bergen’s work on the nature of interstate conflict by 
incorporating the welfare and security framework into 
a theoretical model of strategic interaction between 
nation states. It must be emphasized that interstate con-
flict at present rarely descends into outright ‘war’; even 
the militarized interstate disputes of the present era, say 
between India and Pakistan, are exemplified by their low 
intensity if measured in terms of military casualties. 
Instead, what needs to be understood and modelled, as 
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is done in this article, is hostility between nations, which 
can take the form of the departure from international 
organizations, boycotts, sanctions and the general 
diminution of cooperative behaviour, all short of what 
is normally understood as war. The article begins by 
selectively reviewing what economists in the past 
thought about the nature of war and what would achieve 
peace. I then build a model in the Tinbergian spirit that 
allows us to focus on the simultaneous analysis of welfare 
and insecurity. Finally, the relevance of Tinbergen’s 
analysis in our era of heightened insecurity is demon-
strated. This insecurity is a by-product of extreme or 
hyper-globalization of our present era, resulting in the 
emergence of structural and enduring inequalities, 
including inequalities of opportunity, as well as the rise 
in populism and interstate hostility short of outright war. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: the next 
section outlines the evolution of endogenous notions of 
war within the domain of economics. A two-country 
theoretical model, in the spirit of Tinbergen & Fischer’s 
(1987) outline of a social welfare or utility function, 
where welfare and security go hand in hand, is then 
constructed in the context of peaceful and less peaceful 
states of interstate interaction. These peaceful and less 
peaceful states can be affected by actions and efforts by 
both countries engendering interdependence, and I 
demonstrate the Pareto superiority of cooperative beha-
viour, akin to Tinbergen’s (1990) advocacy of world 
government. Non-cooperative behaviour by states is also 
associated with moral hazard and there can be free-riding 
in peaceful behaviour by some states. Before concluding, 
I extend the model to demonstrate moral hazard, as well 
as situations when an immiserized median voter may be 
induced to vote for more aggressive behaviour by his 
government on the international stage. 
Endogenous war 
Mainstream economics has traditionally regarded war to 
be mainly outside the realm of economic analysis, except 
with reference to the costs of war and the bounded (or 
limited) rationality of war, as war when compared to a 
negotiated settlement is more damaging, and therefore 
irrational. We may even be tempted to conclude that 
mainstream economics regards war as an exogenous phe-
nomenon. In the positive sense the damage done by war 
on infrastructure, productive capacity and output, along 
with other adverse phenomena such as inflation, has long 
been considered in economic analysis. As early as in 
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776/1966) the 
costs of  maintaining an army is  mentioned. The 
sovereign may have the duty to maintain the security 
of his/her subjects from violence and invasion, but it 
comes at a price, which contemporary economists have 
described as the military burden of providing security, 
also alluding to the military establishment’s insatiable 
appetite for additional resources; see, for example Smith 
(2009). In historical terms, we have the work of Charles 
Davenant (1695/2019) who wrote at length about ways 
of financing war, with a warning about the perils of long-
term borrowing in this connection. By contrast, political 
sociologists, such as Charles Tilly (1992), have pointed 
out the role of war in state-building, asserting that in the 
historical European context the need for ever more com-
plex military establishments necessitated enhanced state 
capacity, including fiscal capacity, leading to the state’s 
increased ability to provide a growing array of public 
goods, as well as its role in economic management. 
Mercantilist motives can, however, make war endo-
genous to the objective of accumulation at the expense 
of others. The acquisition of trade monopolies and 
resources with which to manufacture and trade can turn 
war into a tool to achieve these objectives; see Findlay 
& O’Rourke (2007) for a historical account of the 
relationship between trade and power in the last mil-
lennium. The theory of economic imperialism may also 
be considered in this context (Hobson, 1902/1948; 
Lenin, 1917/1963). The competition for markets and 
resources, and even the need to exploit foreign cheap 
labour for the purposes of manufacture could lead to 
war. Another source of endogenous war could emerge 
as a result of the Malthusian trap which can be traced 
back to the work of Thomas Malthus (1798/1965). 
War might act as a ‘positive’ check when population 
growth outstripped the available produce of agriculture, 
which Malthus felt to be subject to diminishing returns, 
due to the fixity of available land, even if occasional 
productivity improvements in agriculture were possi-
ble. This also meant that wars, such as the Thirty Years 
War in the 17th century, as well as epidemics such as 
the Black Death in 14th century Europe could at least 
temporarily raise the living standards of workers, as the 
population dramatically declined compared to land, the 
fixed factor, whose productivity was largely undimin-
ished by war or pestilence; see, for example, Voightlän-
der & Voth (2013). 
With respect to the opportunity costs of war, Haa-
velmo (1954) provides us with a general equilibrium 
framework in which the trade-off between production 
and appropriation is modelled. Mankind can earn a liv-
ing through production, or alternatively engage in pre-
dation. But war has costs,  including the military 
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expenditure to acquire capable armed forces, as well as 
the damage done by war. Pigou (1921) provided us with 
a measure of the military burden or defence expenditure 
in the UK just before World War I, which he estimated 
to be about 4% of national income in the UK around 
1913 (Pigou, 1921: Chapter 2). He also deals with how a 
war economy functions in terms of the effect on con-
sumption, investment and aspects of war finance. Keynes 
(1920/2004) was deeply opposed to the punitive terms 
of the ‘Carthaginian Peace’ imposed on Germany at the 
Treaty of Versailles in 1919 because he felt that the 
hardships imposed on the German people and economy 
would prevent the economic recovery of Europe, making 
Central  Europe ripe for revolution and political  
instability. 
Economists in the 19th century were less concerned 
with war, as they felt that trade stimulated peaceful rela-
tionships between nations and peoples, and the benefits 
of free trade would be lost when military conflicts broke 
out. For example, John Stuart Mill (1840/1968) argued 
that intensified international economic relations would 
reduce the incentives for conflicts among nations. 
Richard Cobden (1835/1978) considered commerce to 
be the panacea for interstate rivalry. Also, in a celebrated 
work at the time of its publication just before World War 
I, Sir Norman Angell (1910) argued that war between 
nations was utterly futile; it would be so destructive that 
even the victor’s war-related losses would outweigh any 
gains. Pigou (1921: Chapter 3), however, argued that the 
interests of the armaments industry and the competing 
interests among great powers associated with imperialism 
exacerbated the risk of war. Schumpeter (1954) believed 
that the growth of advanced capitalism would render war 
between nations less likely. 
The belief – shared by classical and neoclassical econ-
omists – that intensified economic ties could be the basis 
of peaceful relationships between countries at first sight 
makes economic analysis of cooperation and conflict 
unnecessary. It is almost as if economists should focus 
on ways to secure free trade and full employment. But 
the notion of security (armed peace) needs to be incor-
porated into welfare, along with efforts to strengthen the 
peace if needs be via economic means (economic inte-
gration); the liberal peace concept (Gleditsch, 2008). 
This should minimize the risk of war, but even in a state 
of peace hostility between nations may still persist. Also, 
the peace based upon mutual economic interdependence 
which is central to the liberal or capitalist peace is not 
something that always emerges endogenously, nor is it 
always self-enforcing. International cooperation through 
commitment to common membership of international 
organizations, or even world government, is needed to 
secure the ‘liberal’ peace. Indeed, around the time of the 
outbreak of World War II, Lionel Robbins (1939/1968) 
argued that war was a consequence of the absence of 
federation at certain levels, implying that national eco-
nomic sovereignty needed to be curtailed to ensure 
greater international economic policy coordination. 
A Tinbergian model of interstate conflict 
Currently, most wars are internal wars, which are also 
described as intrastate or civil wars. Yet interstate ten-
sions, short of militarized conflict, still persist. Many 
Cold War rivalries have re-emerged; examples include 
the Syrian civil war, the recent escalation of hostilities 
between the USA and Iran, and trade-related hostility 
between the USA and China (see van Bergeijk, 2019). 
Tinbergen’s life, encompassing the bulk of the 20th cen-
tury, was dominated by intense interstate conflict: the 
two World Wars and the Cold War that followed, with 
its ever-present threat of planetary extinction. The was-
tefulness of wars and the preparation for wars, which, in 
addition to collateral damage, created immense human 
suffering, was something Tinbergen was acutely aware 
of. The moral underpinnings of his economic analysis 
were modestly but oft-stated in his quest for an ‘opti-
mum social order’.3 This involved not just the maximi-
zation of utilitarian welfare,4 but also the elimination of 
poverty, the attenuation of inequality and the feeling of 
security; see Tinbergen & Fischer (1987) as an example. 
Above all, Tinbergen clearly states that ‘welfare’ and 
security are inseparable. Incidentally, the welfare func-
tion in Chapter 2 of Tinbergen & Fischer (1987) also 
has utility declining in inequality, something that would 
not fit in easily with our contemporary world (and is a 
challenge to mainstream economics as well). 
The hallmark of Tinbergen & Fischer’s (1987) theo-
retical contribution is that welfare cannot be assessed just 
in terms of the traditional notion of consumption (of 
private and public goods), but also includes security. 
This analytical approach differs from the mainstream 
approach to the ‘war’ sector that concentrated on the 
problem of how to produce an exogenously determined 
level of military security at minimal cost (Hitch & 
McKean, 1960: 2). In the view of Tinbergen and 
3 As in Jean Bodin’s (1576/1955) idea of a well-ordered society. 
4 The greatest good of the greatest number, to quote Jeremy 
Bentham, which can be naı̈vely construed as the sum of individual 
utilities, without due regard for the rapidly diminishing marginal 
utility of extra income for the already very rich and super-rich! 
     
 
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Fischer, military expenditure, particularly of the defen-
sive variety, could be justified as it permits the existence 
of the other inputs into welfare. Moreover, aggregate 
welfare is greater in a state of peace, albeit an armed 
peace involving some military expenditure for self-
defence, than in a more hostile environment where the 
risk of war is greater. Hence, uncertainty needs to be 
introduced into the calculus of warfare and welfare (see 
also van Bergeijk, 1987). 
The remainder of this section builds a model of stra-
tegic interaction between two countries (a home coun-
try, H, and a foreign country, F) that are hostile to one 
another in two states, both falling short of outright 
armed conflict. One state of the world is more peaceful 
with greater aggregate income and the provision of 
security-unrelated public goods (health, education and 
social protection) compared to the less peaceful or more 
hostile state.5 Security expenditure is greater in the more 
hostile state. Both countries can affect the probability of 
the more peaceful state by an action that is unique to the 
country, but each country is impacted by the action of 
the other. Examples of these are a greater willingness to 
negotiate, accommodate and enter into agreements, state 
visits, but also negative interaction such as (economic) 
sanctions, recalling of ambassadors or ending the mem-
bership of regional integration initiatives (Brexit). My 
model, thus, presupposes greater commerce and joint 
membership of international organizations, both pillars 
of the liberal peace between nations (Gleditsch, 2008), as 
well as threats to the liberal peace. In this manner, we 
model changes in international interdependence. 
As indicated, there are two states of nature: one more 
peaceful (P) and the other associated with greater conflict 
or hostility (C).6 Their probabilities are defined as P and 
1–P, respectively. An important feature of our model is 
that states of hostility, or peace, are relative. The prob-
ability of either state is affected by an action (a) by the 
home country and effort (e) by the foreign country. 
These are also the strategic variables employed by the 
two sides. We postulate that the probability of the good 
(peaceful) state P changes with the input of action and 
effort by the two sides, but at diminishing rates. These 
probabilities are based on a common distribution 
5 See Addison, Le Billon & Murshed (2002) for a sketch of a similar 
model upon which the present model is based. 
6 Conflict does not mean war as traditionally understood, but hostile 
actions such as  sending out the navy,  imposing sanctions,  
withdrawing from treaties or just aggressively pursuing trade or 
territorial disputes. 
function on the likelihood of the two states, and are, 
therefore symmetric for both nations.7 
Actions and efforts influence the probability of peace, 
but they do entail costs for each country, and these are 
explicitly modelled via cost functions. The costs of 
actions to promote peace could, for example, take a vari-
ety of forms including diplomatic expenditures and 
numerous forms of goodwill expenditure (van Bergeijk 
& Moons, 2018). In addition, there may be non-
pecuniary costs, such as the loss of face to domestic 
political supporters, for example for Donald Trump if 
he is perceived to be soft to China, or the British Con-
servative Prime Minister if he or she makes concessions 
to Europe, or to Narendra Modi if he was seen to be 
conciliatory to Pakistan. More importantly, there are 
costs associated with messaging domestic constituents 
about the relative merits of peaceful actions or vice versa. 
The risk-neutral expected social welfare (UH) of the 
home country (H) is given by 
    
UH ¼ a; e þ ð1 Þð  ÞU C Y Cð ÞU P Y P a; eH H H H 
C a mð ð ; nÞÞ 
The assumption of risk neutrality may appear strong. 
It may be justified by arguing that we are modelling 
government behaviour with regard to peace and hostility 
towards other nations short of outright war. Relaxing the 
assumption will not alter the qualitative nature of the 
results that follow, particularly in connection with the 
superiority of  cooperative behaviour over non-
cooperative outcomes. Due to the property of risk neu-
trality, welfare or utility can be described in terms of 
expected utility payoffs (Ys): 
UH ¼ a; e H þ ð1 Þð  ÞY C C a mð ; nÞÞð ÞY P a; e ðH 
ð1Þ 
where YPH and Y
C
H denote payoffs in peace and conflict, 
respectively, weighted by the probabilities of the two 
states. C is the cost function of undertaking the action, 
a. Action, a, increases the probability of peace, P, but 
undertaking it entails a cost, for example in terms of 
foregone revenue. Also, Pa > 0, but Paa < 0. Both Ca 
> 0 and Caa > 0. The cost functions will be influenced by 
domestic identity-based politics, Ca1<0, Ca2>0. There 
are two messages, one internationalist (m) which lowers 
the cost of peaceful behaviour for the state, and another 
(n) sending out a nationalistic message raising the cost of 
7 The probabilities could also be made subjective, see Jeffrey (2004). 
They may also be formed in a Bayesian fashion by updating priors, 
which is unnecessary in our single period framework. 




peaceful behaviour in the welfare function. Disposable 
income and public goods provision (such as health, edu-
cation and social protection) are greater in the relative 
state of greater peace (YH
P) than in the more hostile state 
(YH
C), and there is less harmful military expenditure 
crowding out other public goods in the peaceful state. 
Normally, the individual rational economic man or homo 
economicus would have a strong preference for the peace-
ful state; a notable exception in real life would be the 
Brexit referendum which produced a majority to be 
poorer and less secure. Other examples include the elec-
tion of Donald Trump in the USA in 2016, the election 
victories of the incumbent Indian Prime Minister, 
Narendra Modi and the British Prime Minister, Boris 
Johnson in 2019. Tinbergen & Fischer (1987: Chapter 2) 
explicitly enter the probability of a more peaceful world 
conditional on the implementation of a variety of rele-
vant arms control treaties at the time. Hence, even if the 
peaceful state generates more welfare, its probability is 
enhanced by the choice of costly peaceful actions, both 
at home and abroad. 
Turning to the foreign country (F), we similarly have 
UF ¼ a; e þ ð1 Þð  ÞY C ð Þð ÞY P a; e E e mð ; n ÞF F 
ð2Þ 
A similar set of arguments apply to the foreign coun-
try, E is the cost of effort, e, which increases the prob-
ability of peace, P. Also,  Pe > 0, but  Pee < 0,  Ee > 0,  
and Eee > 0. Also, similar messaging impacts on the cost 
of peaceful behaviour with one message lowering costs 
of peaceful behaviour, and another increasing it, Ee1 <0, 
Ee2 >0. 
In the non-cooperative or Cournot-Nash type inter-
action, the two sides move simultaneously. The solution 
to the model involves each side maximizing its utility 
function or payoff with respect to its own choice vari-
able. For the home government it means maximizing 
utility from expected payoffs in Equation (1) with 
respect to a as shown by 
 @UH P C¼ a YH YH Ca ¼ 0 ð3Þ 
@a 
The foreign state maximizes Equation (2) with respect 
to e 
 @UF ¼ e YF P YF C Ee ¼ 0 ð4Þ 
@e 
Note that in Equations (3) and (4) each country will 
equate its marginal benefit from exercising its own stra-
tegic choice to the corresponding marginal cost. 
World government 
It is interesting to consider a counterfactual situation 
where both sides are compelled to cooperate by an out-
side power or agency. This is similar to Tinbergen’s 
advocacy of world government; see Kol & Wolff 
(1993) and Tinbergen (1987). In order to further our 
understanding of such cooperative behaviour between 
nations we may allude to two theoretical concepts from 
economics. The first is to do with the ‘we’ or group 
rationality invoked by Robert Sugden (1991) among 
others. This is when individuals think of the group or 
team they belong to and factor in what is good for this 
collective in the process of individual decisionmaking 
and welfare calculus. Although it might be difficult to 
envisage such ‘global’ rationality, it is not in the realm of 
impossibility, and in the spirit of Tinbergen as an ideal to 
be strived for.8 The second notion is to do with Kenneth 
Boulding’s (1989) concept of integrative power. The 
exercise of this sort of power results in voluntary com-
pliance, as opposed to the power of threats when poten-
tial force is at stake, or exchange power when motivation 
is derived from the gains from trade. Integrative power 
may involve use of psychic, social or religious sanctions, 
but in the main, invokes compliance from a sense of 
duty. In an ideal state, nations may be motivated to 
federate and act jointly via forces other than coercion 
and the benefits of mutual exchange. 
The individual decisionmaking functions of the two 
countries are now federated into a joint decisionmaking 
authority. The upshot of this discussion is that it will 
lead to the maximization of welfare (W), by summing the 
payoffs in Equations (1) and (2) together in a utilitarian 
fashion. This summing of payoffs is akin to the addition 
of individual incomes in a social welfare function; see 
Myerson (1981), for example. The existence of social 
welfare functions was brought into doubt by the Impos-
sibility Theorem, proposed by Kenneth Arrow (1950), 
based on a number of restrictive axioms. Harsanyi 
(1955), however, provides us with a justification of uti-
litarianism, particularly when we go beyond the restric-
tiveness of ordinal utility, which only permits the 
ranking of alternative preferences. 
Be that as it may, at some level, the single global 
welfare function, sum of equation (1) and (2), is  
8 It could be argued that the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in 
2020 would have been managed better if nations had acted in a more 
cooperative fashion. 
         
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maximized with respect to a: 
@W    P C P C¼ a YH YH þ a YF YF Ca ¼ 0 
@a 
ð5Þ 
and with respect to e: 
@W    P C P C¼ e YF YF þ e YH YH Ee ¼ 0 ð6Þ 
@e 
Comparing Equation (3) with Equation (5), and Equa-
tion (4) with Equation (6), we discover that the equili-
brium levels of both a and e are greater. This is because the 
marginal benefits of peaceful actions and efforts for both 
countries have risen, as indicated by the square bracketed 
second terms in the right-hand sides of (5) and (6). Both 
terms inside the squared brackets in (5) and (6) are pos-
itive, as payoffs in the peaceful state are greater than in 
times of conflict. The benefits of actions by the home 
country for the foreign nation, as well as the benefits of 
efforts by the foreign country for the home nation are now 
internalized. Hence, cooperation is Pareto superior to 
non-cooperative Cournot-Nash behaviour, as the global 
marginal benefit of both a and e is equated to marginal 
cost. Note, however, that even the cooperative outcome 
may not be completely free of strife. Despite that, our 
finding is in the spirit of world government, as advocated 
by Tinbergen (1987), because he felt national govern-
ments were too myopic; in our case, as will be demon-
strated below, they can inadvertently conspire to generate 
moral hazard. The equilibrium described by (5) and (6) is 
on the ‘contract curve’, unlike the non-cooperative solu-
tion denoted by (3) and (4). 
Returning to non-cooperative interaction, each side’s 
strategic choices will depend on the first order conditions 
for a maximum given in Equations (3) and (4), along 
with a fixed conjecture about the opposition’s strategic 
choice. These lead to the (linear) reaction functions for 
both sides, obtained by totally differentiating Equations 
(3) and (4) with respect to a and e. For the home country 
this is indicated by 
C Pde Caa þ aa½ YH YH¼ . . .  0 . . .  if ae 0 da=RH ae½ YHP YHC 
ð7Þ 
and for the foreign nation by 
de ae½ YFP YFC ¼ . . .  0 . . .  if . . .  ae 0C Pda=RF Eee þ ee½ YF YF
ð8Þ 










































Figure 2. Strategic substitutes 
The reaction functions are positively sloped if Pae > 0,  
implying that the two strategies are complements (Figure 1). 
This is the standard assumption in the literature on conflict. 
In our model, however, we also allow for the possibility that 
Pae < 0, the choice variables are strategic substitutes, and the 
reaction functions could therefore slope downwards 
(Figure 2). This occurs because the strategy space is defined 
in  terms of peace.  Thus, if one  side  behaves more peacefully  
it increases the utility from payoffs for both parties, and the 
other country may free-ride on this action by not bringing 
about a corresponding increase in their action. It must also 
be remembered that action and effort are not without their 
costs. Also recall that we are concerned with relative states of 
hostility and peace, not armed conflict. 
Moral hazard 
Furthermore, the non-cooperative solution to the model 
generates moral hazard. From the viewpoint of some of 
the domestic citizenry and the rest of the world, the 
 
         
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actions and efforts by the two governments are not always 
observable or verifiable. Also, neither side has the incen-
tive to engage in globally optimal levels of action or effort 
to promote peace. Examples could include efforts to stem 
transnational terrorism, drug cartels and other global pub-
lic ‘bads’, which tend to increase disputes between nation 
states. This could also extend to actions to stem the spread 
of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the moral hazard is 
found in both parties, we have double moral hazard, as 
analysed in Murshed & Sen (1995). In both Figures 1 and 
2, the non-cooperative solution associated with moral 
hazard is given by point N. The fully cooperative and 
Pareto optimal solution is illustrated at point C, but that 
requires international cooperation, policy coordination or 
even world government as advocated by Tinbergen & 
Fischer (1987) or Tinbergen (1990). 
Also, in Figure 2, when the strategies are substitutes 
we have an additional ‘equity’ problem. In the non-
cooperative equilibrium (point N) the home country has 
effectively passed on some of the burden of adjustment 
to the foreign nation. Once again the examples that 
spring to mind are policies to tackle pandemics, terror-
ism and international crime, where nations seem to occa-
sionally pass the buck on to other countries and free-ride 
on them. In fact, the level of effort exercised by the 
foreign country is greater than in the cooperative solu-
tion. We could say that the home country is free-riding 
on the other nation. The positions could equally be 
reversed, between home and foreign countries. The elim-
ination of double moral hazard requires the design of a 
mechanism that induces cooperation and transparency. 
Extensions 
What if one side, say the government, acts as a Stackel-
berg leader? Analytically speaking, this means the leader 
takes the follower’s reaction function into account while 
maximizing its utility or payoff. Diagrammatically, the 
leader’s utility or payoff function is made tangent to the 
follower’s reaction function. A variety of multiple equili-
bria are possible under Stackelberg leader–follower situa-
tions. We depict some of the possibilities by the point S 
in Figures 1 and 2. These are associated with Pareto 
improvements on Cournot-Nash behaviour. But this is 
not necessarily always the case, as a variety of equilibria 
are possible.9 We may argue that the first-best outcome 
is globally cooperative equilibria; non-cooperative 
(Cournot-Nash) behaviour produces second-best 
9 Sometimes a Stackelberg leader is worse off than the follower in 
relative terms compared to the Cournot-Nash outcome. 
outcomes. In some situations, the second-best non-
cooperative outcome may be inferior to outcomes when 
there is a Stackelberg leader (a powerful and enlightened 
country) taking into account the reactions of followers 
(smaller countries), as may be argued to have been the 
case for Western nations during periods of the Cold War 
(1950s and 1960s) under US hegemony. 
An increase in the cost of peaceful behaviour in one 
country (the foreign nation) is shown by point in both 
Figures 1 and 2, which is a downward movement in the 
foreign reaction functions. In Figure 1 when the two 
activities are strategic complements there is a clear wel-
fare loss. In Figure 2, however, the two strategies are 
substitutes. The decrease in effort by the foreign country 
is matched by an increase in home country action. This 
might mean an improvement from the non-cooperative 
outcome at point N in Figure 2, as the home country was 
free-riding on the foreign nation at that point. Analyti-
cally it implies an increase in the cost of peaceful beha-
viour for the foreign country, from Equation (2). 
Differentiating the arguments inside the cost function 
for peaceful behaviour, E, in Equation (2) with respect 
to its arguments, and maximizing with respect to e: 
 P C 
e YF YF ¼ Ee1dm þ Ee2dn; Ee1 < 0; Ee2 > 0 
ð9Þ 
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (9) 
lowers the cost of peaceful behaviour or international 
cooperation; the second term has the opposite effect. 
An increase in hostility implies that the latter dominates 
the former. 
When is there a rise in belligerent behaviour on the 
part of certain nations? Examples would be the British 
Brexit referendum, the actions of President Trump of 
the USA vis-à-vis Iran, and the behaviour of the Modi 
government in India in respect of Kashmir, which 
heightens tensions with Pakistan. These developments 
have their genesis in democratic institutions, elections 
and referenda, even though neither Brexit nor Trump’s 
behaviour can be regarded as liberal.10 Again, econo-
mistic explanations may be paramount. The genesis of 
current hostile tendencies (trade wars, Brexit) may lie in 
the rise of interpersonal and functional inequality, co-
terminus with the viral contagion of fake news spread by 
the electronic media. The result is populist tendencies 
10 For example, Rodrik (2017) helps us to understand that societies 
characterized by regular free and fair elections can nevertheless behave 
in an illiberal demagogic fashion from time to time, as feared by 
classical liberals who wished to restrict the franchise. 
   
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focusing on primeval identity with little heed paid to 
economic self-interest which is meant to characterize 
homo economicus. Identity may trump (economic) inter-
ests; identity-based behaviour may entail hostility to ‘an 
other’, a sentiment that populist demagogues play up in 
order to feather their own political and economic inter-
ests; see the analysis in Glaeser (2005) and the connec-
tion made between identity politics and the Nazi regime 
(Caruso, 2016). 
It is now useful to move from the aggregate behaviour 
or the state’s actions that we have described until now to 
the analysis of the individual. To analyse how hostility 
may be rising in our contemporary world, consider the 
behaviour of an individual voter in the model sketched 
above. This individual has income, Yi, and could be the 
median voter, who in an electoral process may swing the 
national policy outcome, or at least determine its direc-
tion. In a society that is unequal, the median individual 
has an income (or endowments) below the mean (YF) for 
that society, and in that sense we may deem him to be 
poor. He is faced with two prospects to vote on, one 
which advances his own income relative to the mean but 
is less resonant with narrow (ethnic or national) identity, 
and another which disadvantages him as an individual 
but may raise national mean income, and above all is in 
line with what he regards as appropriate identity-based 
behaviour. This, latter, policy vector will enrich the elite 
in his group, because even if mean national income rises, 
median income falls because of the relentless pursuit of 
laissez faire with dwindling social protection. 
    
Ui ¼ w1ð  ;mÞ YiP ; G þ w2ðð1 Þ; nÞ YiC ; I 
ð10Þ 
Individual subjective decision weights attached to 
what we described as relative peace (w1) and hostility 
(w2) are determined partially by their more objective 
probabilities of peace and conflict (P, 1–P), but also 
by preferences that are influenced by domestic demago-
guery in terms of meme messages (m, n). Note, the 
partial derivatives associated with the decision weights 
are positive. The idea of the decision weight emanates 
from the theorizing of Kahneman & Tversky (1979), 
and Tversky & Kahneman’s (1992) prospect theory 
which permits framing in the mind of the individual, 
who may attach a greater weight to a prospect or out-
come in an uncertain world based on its desirability. 
Hence the outcome associated with the decision weight 
w2 may be regarded as more worthy compared to alter-
native outcomes by an individual, even if it is less likely 
in the probabilistic sense of expected utility. Thus, 
decision weights differ from conventional probabilities; 
all probabilities may be framed in the mind, but decision 
weights emanating from prospect theory are connected 
to the individual’s perceptions of what is a more worthy 
outcome. 
In Equation (10), the probability of the individual 
voting for a set of policies that promotes a more peaceful 
and integrated world depends positively on a message, m, 
sent out by one group of liberal politicians, and nega-
tively on a (populist) message, n, sent out by another set 
of populist interests.11 These rival messages compete in 
the framing process of the individual’s mind-set. But his 
personal circumstances also play a part, and may lead to a 
preference for narrow identity-based outcomes, such as 
I in (10). 
A relatively deprived voter who is  precariously 
employed with declining social protection may give 
greater credence to the latter ‘meme’ message because 
it is more intrinsically desirable; in other words, w2n > 
w1m, the efficacy of the populist meme message is 
greater. In the state of relative peace his individual 
income relative to the mean rises (or is at least constant); 
he also obtains a vector of public goods, G. In the less 
peaceful state, his identity-based set of outcomes is rea-
lized; he obtains I, but his individual income relative to 
the mean declines, although national income relative to 
the foreign country may increase.12 In a sense the indi-
vidual knows and votes for something which makes him 
proud to be English or American even when it is a 
Pyrrhic victory, as he makes the already rich in his own 
nation richer, as many voters who voted for Trump were 
only too painfully aware of. Out of a sense of identity, 
they voted to become poorer. Following Rodrik (2017), 
we could argue that because the poor median voter was 
not compensated for his loss of individual income and 
employment insecurity due to greater globalization in 
the past, he is less likely at present to put a greater weight 
on the peaceful outcome. He now tends to mistrust the 
more liberal supra-national or internationalized out-
come, and any promises of redistribution are now much 
11 The success of the populist (memetic) message may resonate more 
and circulate like a biological virus in our increasingly plutocratic 
world which is nevertheless characterized by universal access to the 
electronic media. 
12 The voter believes this can be achieved by pursuing America-first 
protectionist policies and restricting immigration, because of his 
cognitive dissonance or an ardent desire to engage in time travel 
back to an era where manufacturing jobs were plentiful, the 
standard of living was increasing, Great Britain and the USA were 
great and more powerful than now, and prospects for future 
generations appeared very bright. Ergo, sometime in the 1960s. 
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less credible. His choice, however, makes the world less 
secure. 
Conclusions 
Jan Tinbergen was passionate about designing world 
peace, the global counterpart of his notion of a socially 
optimal order. In the pursuit of that goal, he advocated 
economic analysts to view war, or for that matter conflict 
more generally, as a phenomenon that was endogenous 
and not exogenous to the variables of interest to the 
economist. Secondly, welfare and security could not be 
separated in the sense that welfare was greater in a more 
secure or peaceful global setting when nations felt more 
secure vis-á-vis each other without excessive and wasteful 
offensive military expenditure. Tinbergen also believed 
in the superiority of governance at the global level 
because nation states often behave myopically. In fact, 
he advocated a revamped and more effective United 
Nations system. A more modest achievement would be 
international cooperation at a more regional level, as 
with the European Union. 
I have attempted to model some of these ideas. I first 
construct expected welfare functions for two countries 
weighted by the probabilities of peaceful and more con-
flictual states of nature. The peaceful state is more secure 
and gives greater welfare. Actions and efforts by both 
countries enhance the probability of peace and hence 
nations are interdependent as far as security is concerned. 
Non-cooperative behaviour is Pareto inferior to coopera-
tive behaviour and also produces moral hazard and free-
riding. There can be an endogenous increase in hostility 
by nations driven by populist identity-based politics, 
which have their genesis in rising inequality, and the 
decline of median incomes and life prospects. Thus, the 
politics of populism is endogenous to the disadvantaging 
evolution of capitalism in recent years, and the shape that 
greater globalization has taken in the past four decades. 
The current rules of globalization and capitalism, 
dubbed as hyper-globalization by Rodrik (2017), seem 
to mainly serve elites who are owners of internationally 
mobile skills and wealth. There is an alarming rise in 
inequality, worldwide, exemplified by the rising ratio 
of wealth or capital to national income (Piketty, 2014). 
In a global context, Milanovic (2016: Figure 1.8) 
demonstrates that the share of billionaires’ wealth relative 
to global GDP was under 3% in 1987; this had increased 
to more than 6% by 2013. Accompanying this, the 
national income share of the middle class (defined as 
having an income in the range of 25% above and 25% 
below median national income) declined over this time 
period in nearly all Western democracies, with the 
United States exhibiting the lowest middle-class share, 
and the UK not far behind with the fourth lowest share 
(Milanovic, 2016: Figure 4.8). In recent years the great-
est beneficiaries of changes in the global income distri-
bution have been the world’s super rich (the top 1% in 
the income distribution), along with the middle classes 
in emerging market economies like China and India; the 
greatest losers have been the lower  middle and  low  
income groups in developed countries. 
This rising inequality, along with the despair it pro-
duces, sows the seeds of populist politics, which takes the 
form of a seeming backlash to globalization, involving 
greater hostility in international relations, as well as to 
minorities in the domestic context. Rodrik (2017) 
describes the globalization trilemma, whereby the simul-
taneous achievement of national sovereignty, democracy 
and hyper-globalization is impossible. In a hyper-
globalized context, further economic integration in terms 
of adverse distributional consequences outweighs the 
gains in terms of  enhanced income. Hyper-
globalization also means that the earlier domestic social 
contract and an earlier postwar commitment to a welfare 
state may become untenable, in parallel with the growth 
of precarious employment. 
Rodrik (2018) argues that earlier on, the advance of 
globalization was made relatively more acceptable in 
Europe compared to the United States, given the greater 
prevalence of social protection on the continent. Gradu-
ally, after 1980, and especially since the dawn of the new 
millennium, more and more groups have been disadvan-
taged by globalization and labour-saving technical prog-
ress, and the politics of austerity has diminished social 
protection, fraying pre-existing domestic social contracts, 
and social mobility has been greatly diminished. A retreat 
from hyper-globalization may be desirable, even a return 
to the halcyon days of the Bretton Woods era (1945 to 
1973), but not through channels that diminish interna-
tional cooperation and partnership, like Brexit and Pres-
ident Trump’s protectionist sabre rattling, because they 
will serve to further immiserize the already disadvan-
taged. What is needed is internationally coordinated 
checks on hyper-globalization and agreements on certain 
wealth taxes on the richest individuals, as well as brakes 
on job destroying automation. These policies are needed 
to address the alarming rise in wealth inequality, given 
the fact that social protection alone can only have a 
palliative, but not curative, impact on these inequalities. 
Rodrik’s trilemma, however, is not merely the state-
ment of an impossibility theorem, but a clarion call to 
complement economic integration with political  
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integration. Indeed, the trilemma also has a solution: 
world government (van Bergeijk, 2019: 70). This is 
because one of the problems associated with the tri-
lemma is the extent of international economic integra-
tion without sufficient attention being paid to the 
interests and views of constituencies within nation states. 
Global government can resolve the political dilemma by 
restricting and governing globalization so that it con-
forms to the social contracts that democratically emerge 
in the world. While that may seem naı̈ve to many main-
stream economists, it would be exactly the kind of point 
that Tinbergen might have made. World government, 
international development and greater equality within 
and between countries are in the end necessary require-
ments for a world order that sustainably ensures welfare 
and security as Tinbergen had envisioned. 
Acknowledgements 
I am indebted to Peter van Bergeijk for enlightening me 
on many aspects of Jan Tinbergen’s work and thinking, 
especially in relation to war and peace. An earlier version 
of the article was presented at the Network of European 
Peace Scientists (NEPS) Conference at The Hague in the 
Netherlands, held between 23 and 25 June 2019. I am 
grateful to three anonymous referees of this journal 
whose comments have greatly improved the article. 
ORCID iD 
S Mansoob Murshed https://orcid.org/0000-0002-83 
60-033X 
References 
Addison, Tony; Philippe Le Billon & S Mansoob Murshed 
(2002) Conflict in Africa: The cost of peaceful behaviour. 
Journal of African Economies 11(3): 365–386. 
Angell, Norman (1910) The Great Illusion: A Study of the 
Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and 
Social Advantage. London: Heinemann. 
Arrow, Kenneth J (1950) A difficulty in the concept of social 
welfare. Journal of Political Economy 58(4): 328–346. 
Bodin, Jean (1576/1955) Les Six Livres de la République [The 
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